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The release of  individual housing credit application data, combined with lender and 
neighborhood information required by amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) in 1989, has offered new opportunities to examine the roles of both 
neighborhood and individual race in credit availability. The extent to which objective 
lending criteria are responsible for observed differences in home mortgage credit denial 
rates, versus discrimination based on income, race, or neighborhood (redlining), has been 
the subject of considerable debate. 
This paper provides a more detailed documentation of racial and neighborhood differences 
in denial rates than has previously been available. Using estimates from a fixed-effects 
linear probability model to decompose racial differences in application denial rates, the 
authors find persistent variations between white and minority applicants, particularly 
blacks.  The variance is widespread and remains even after lender, neighborhood, and 
applicant economic characteristics are accounted for. While the HMDA data do not 
contain enough relevant information about the loan applications to draw any firm 
conclusions about the reasons for these differences, some possibilities include property 
location, credit or employment histories, loan-to-value ratios, or other factors considered in 
the loan evaluation process that are not included in the HMDA file. 
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Despite the passage of  several laws related specifically to racial differences in 
housing credit availability, data constraints have limited the number of studies of this 
issue.'  Most existing studies use census-tract-level or lender-level data collected under 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to infer racial differences.  Although 
findings from such work are by  necessity indirect,  there is a persistent inference of 
substantial differences in the availability of mortgage and other credit across racial 
groups.  Unfortunately, most of this work has been hampered by  the inability to separate 
the effects of  the race of  the applicant from the racial composition of  the applicant's 
neighb~rhood.~  Studies that use detailed applicant-level information to examine the 
direct effects on mortgage denial rates of  both property location and the race of  the 
applicant are rare.3 
The release of  individual application data, combined with lender and 
neighborhood data as required by  amendments to the HMDA in 1989, offers 
unprecedented new opportunities to examine the issue of  the role of both neighborhood 
and individual race in credit availability.  Early reports based on the 1990 HMDA data 
document differences in denial rates on home mortgage credit applications by  race and 
income of  applicants and by  the average income and racial composition of 
neighborhoods (see Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman [1993a] and Canner and Smith [1991, 
19921).  The extent to which objective lending criteria are responsible for these 
differences, versus discrimination based on income, race, or neighborhood (redlining), 
has been the subject of  much analysis and debate. 
In this paper, we provide a more detailed documentation of  racial and 
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of  three loan products (home purchase, refinance, and home improvement), we use 
estimates from a fixed-effects linear probability model to decompose racial differences in 
application denial rates into five components reflecting the portion attributable to 1) 
economic characteristics of  the applications reported in HMDA (income, loan amount, 
loan type, etc.),  2) overall denial rates of the lenders receiving the application, 3) the 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), 4) census tract locations of  the property, and 5) an 
unexplained residual.  We then compare these components across MSAs, across 
neighborhood types grouped by  income and racial composition, across types of lenders, 
and for central city and suburban areas.  We also compare racial differences in denial 
rates across applications grouped by predicted denial rates based on all factors except 
race. 
Our objective in conducting this analysis is twofold.  First, we are interested in 
determining whether racial differences in credit approvals reflect activity in a small 
subset of markets or whether they are endemic to most markets.  Although significant 
media attention has been paid to the issue of  race and mortgage lending, preliminary 
studies using the HMDA data have been limited in scope and restricted to either 
individual cities or specific loan products.  For example, in a study, that has received wide 
media publicity (Mumell et al. [1992]), the Boston Federal ~eserve  Bank conducted an 
expanded survey of loan applications in the Boston area and concluded that even when 
an extensive list of  individual applicant characteristics was controlled for, black and 
Hispanic applicants were significantly more likely to be denied than white applicants. 
This study, however, was limited to one loan product (home purchase loans) and one 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmcity.  Thus,  it is not clear whether the authors' conclusions can be generalized or are 
specific to certain areas.  Second, as stated above, we are interested in determining 
whether racial differences in lending stem from variations in applicant characteristics 
(other than race), differences in the neighborhoods in which properties are located, or 
racial differences that cannot be explained by  these factors. 
By  way  of preview, we find that denial rates for minority applicants are 
consistently higher than those for white applicants with othemke identical attributes (as 
reported in the HMDA data) who are applying for loans with the same lenders, and for 
properties located in the same neighborhoods.  We also find significant neighborhood 
effects that differ across racial groups:  Blacks, in particular, are more likely to apply for 
loans for properties in neighborhoods with higher denial rates, ceteris paribus, than are 
white applicants.  On average, these neighborhood effects are less pronounced than 
individual effects, although they are almost equal for home improvement loans.  We find 
a remarkable degree of  consistency in these conclusions across geographic markets and 
loan products, indicating that the observed racial differences in denial rates are 
widespread and cannot be attributed to a small subset of  markets.  Although our analysis 
reveals substantial and consistent differences in denial rates related to the race of  the 
applicant, even after controlling for a number of  applicant characteristics, we emphasize 
that the HMDA data do not contain enough relevant information about the loan 
applications to draw any firm conclusions about the reasons behind these phenomena. 
These residual differences may be due to credit histories, employment histories, loan-to- 
value ratios, or other factors considered in the loan evaluation process that are not 
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on the race of  the applicant. 
The remainder of this paper is  organized as follows.  In the next section we 
present a simple framework for analysis.  In section II we provide a brief description of 
the HMDA data and summary sample statistics.  Section ID summarizes our results, and 
concluding remarks are given in section IV. 
I.  Framework and Empirical Model 
Consider the following simple, yet fairly general, framework in which to evaluate 
the empirical findings of this study.  Assume that the risk of  each loan application given 
all available ex ante information can be expressed as a risk score, RS.  Further assume 
that each lender decides to approve or deny an application based on a comparison of its 
risk score and the lender's maximum acceptable risk.  If  the risk score is above a cutoff, 
c, the loan is denied; otherwise the loan is accepted.  Note that this abstracts from the 
issue of price by  assuming either that lenders price all loans equally or, because of 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, that lenders have a maximum risk 
acceptable at any price. 
This model of lender behavior is deterministi~'but  in reality error is likely to 
enter the process.  First, lenders may not know, or use, all available information in 
computing risk scores.  In this case, RS would be their estimate of  the applicant's risk 
given the information they use, and the loan-granting dkcision would still be made 
deterministically, but based on a different set of  information.  To a researcher attempting 
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(assuming the researcher has access to all information used by  the lender).  A second 
potential source of  error is more relevant for this paper.  Lenders may use risk score (or 
their own estimate) and behave deterministically, but an external researcher may  only 
observe the lender's assessment of risk with error.  That is, researchers may observe a set 
of  instruments for risk score for which they believe 
(1)  RS = X/3  + e, 
where e is a stochastic error term.  This implies that 
(2)  Denial = 1  if X'S  + e > c,  and 
Denial = 0 otherwise. 
To an external researcher, who does not observe e, the evaluation process appears to be 
probabilistic. 
If  only the lender action (acceptldeny), and not the risk score, is observed, 
4 
estimation of  the parameters in equation (1) requires assumptions about the error term, 
e.  If  the error in (1) is assumed to be uniform, then the probability that a loan 
application will  be denied, given X,  is proportional to X'/3 plus a constant, and the 
parameters in (1) will be estimable from a linear probability model.  If  e is normal, then 
equation (2) gives rise to a probit probability model; and if e is double exponential, then 
(2) gives rise to a logistic probability model.  Although the scaling of  parameters depends 
critically on .the model form, the relative magnitude and signs of  the parameters are 
likely to be robust with respect to the model form chosen. 
Df particular interest for this paper is the robustness (and interpretation) of racial 
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race itself may be a predictor of  future behavior and thus enter the risk score directly. 
This might occur, for example, because minorities face discrimination in labor markets 
and thus have more variable income.  This would appear as different risk scores for 
otherwise equal applications of  different racial groups, or as racial shifts in estimated ps. 
Note that for reasons of  cost, lenders may choose to use estimates of  RS rather than 
fully computing it.  In this case, race might be an instrument for the variables they do 
not use. 
Second, lenders may practice overt discrimination, and set a lower cutoe c, for 
minorities.  To an observer who looks only at the accept/deny process, this case would 
be observationally equivalent to the first case.  Overt discrimination may also take the 
form of  lenders (or a subset of lenders) randomly denying a fixed percentage of 
minorities.  This will also produce a racial shift. 
Third, lenders may in fact not use race, and there may not be any racial shifts in 
the true risk scores.  However, race may be correlated with the omitted variables in the 
error term, e, in equation (1).  Minority applications could differ from others in the 
expectation of  e given X  To the external researcher measuring RS with error, racial 
shifts would show up in estimated ps,  making this observationally equivalent to the first 
two cases, even though race is not used by lenders and does not enter RS.  Note that the 
better that X is  specified, the less this effect should matter. 
We might also observe a combination of these effects.  For example, only a subset 
of lenders might have lower risk thresholds for minority applications.  In this instance, 
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consistent residual differences across lenders in overall denial rates (we would expect 
differences across lenders for other reasons, such as price or preferences for risk).  We 
might also observe combinations of  different racial cutoffs and variations in the expected 
values of the omitted variables, e.  Again, the measured residual differences correlated 
with race would represent a combination of  effects. 
The important point to emphasize here is that each of  these sources of  racial 
shifts, with very different policy implications, is likely to produce observationally 
equivalent results.  Moreover, the estimated shifts will be sensitive to the econometric 
model form chosen.  Unfortunately, there is little other than computational convenience 
to argue for a particular form (we actually employ a linear probability model for this 
reason).  Thus, despite the obvious value in quantifying racial shifts in denial functions, 
these estimates, regardless of  what they are, will be incapable of  distinguishing among 
competing causal models. 
Em~irical  Model 
Our empirical specification follows the framework set out above.  We assume that 
each mortgage application's risk can be represented as a function of  the economic 
characteristics (such as income), neighborhood, market, lender, and race of  the applicant. 
As noted above, we  have no basis with which to select a particulai econometric model 
specification.  However, the size of  the data set dictates that in practice we  assume a 
linear probability model specification.  We thus estimate a model where the probability 
that a random loan application would be denied is linear in the following terms: 
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census tract is denied, and zero otherwise.  MSA, TRACT  and LENDER  are dummy 
variables indicating which MSA,  census tract, and lender the application relates to, and e 
isaa residual.  AC is a vector of  application characteristics, other than race, reported in 
the HMDA data.  AC includes gender, marital status, occupancy, income, loan amount, 
income-to-loan ratio, federal loan guarantee (Federal Housing Administration [FHA] or 
Department of  Veterans Affairs [VA]).  RACE is a dummy variable indicating the race 
of  the applicant and co-applicant.  The model is specified and estimated separately for 
each of  three types of  loan applications: home purchase, refinance, and home 
improvement. 
To help minimize the possibility that the differences within and across 
neighborhoods we identify do not reflect nonlinearities in other effects that are 
correlated with location, we allow for a considerable degree of nonlinearity in the effects 
of  individual characteristics in estimating equation (3).  Income and loan amount are 
entered as linear spline functions with seven knots each, and the ratio of  income to loan 
amount is entered as a series of  six dummy variables.  Moreover, a five-knot linear spline 
for income is interacted with a dummy variable indicating the presence of  a co-applicant, 
and with dummy variables indicating that the application is for an FHA or VA loan. 
Similarly, a five-knot linear spline of loan amount, and the six dummy variables 
indicating ranges of  values for the ratio of income to loan amount, are also interacted 
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dummy variables for six applicant and two co-applicant racial categories, and the racial 
dummies interacted with FHA and VA loan dummies. 
To reduce the computing requirements, the actual estimation was done in two 
stages.  In the first stage, equation (3) was estimated with the individual application 
characteristics (AC) and separate intercepts for each lender-census tract combination 
included as single-component fixed effects?  The MSA, lender, and tract effects are thus 
intertwined in these effects.  In the second stage, an iterative procedure (equivalent to 
regressing the fixed-effects intercepts against MSA, census tract, and lender dummies) 
was used to identify the MSA, tract, and lender effects.  By  construction, the MSA 
effects were normalized to have overall sample means of zero, and within each MSA, 
lender and tract means were normalized to zero.  In cases where lender and tract effects 
were not identified (a lender was the only lender in a tract and did all of its business 
there), the effect was assigned to the tract. 
11.  Data 
AU  commercial banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other 
mortgage lending institutions (primarily mortgage bankers) that have assets of more than 
$10 million, make at least one mortgage loan, and have an office in an MSA are 
required to report on each mortgage loan application acted upon by the institution 
during the calendar year?  They must report the loan amount, the census tract of the 
property (if in an MSA), whether the property is owner-occupied, the purpose of the 
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FHA,  VA), action taken by  the lender (loan approved and originated, application 
approved but withdrawn, application denied), the race and gender of  the loan applicant 
(and co-applicant, if any), and the income relied upon by the lending institution in 
making the loan decisiort6 
In total, 9,333 financial institutions made HMDA filings for 1990 on 6,595,089 
loan applications.  Our  analysis focuses on the 3,489,235 loan applications for 1-4 family 
properties in MSAs that were acted upon by the lenders?  Of  these loans, 1,984,688 
were home purchase loans, 716,595 were applications to refinance existing mortgage 
loans, and 787,952 were applications for home improvement loans (generally second or 
third mortgages).  These applications were received by  8,745 separate institutions 
operating in 40,008 census tracts in all 340 of the MSAs in the United States defined as 
of  1990.  We define lenders at the MSA level:  Thus, an institution reporting applications 
for two different MSAs is treated as two different lenders.  There are 23,248 such 
lenders in our sample.8 
Descriptive statistics for the applications reported in the 1990 HMDA are found 
in table 1.  Statistics are given separately for home purchase, refinancing, and home 
improvement loan applications.  Clearly, housing credit applicants are a select sample of 
American households.  Household mean income ($63,071) is substantially higher than 
that reported for all households in the 1989 Survey of  Consumer Finances ($35,700)? 
The racial composition of the study sample also appears to differ from that of  all U.S. 
households.  Blacks constituted 6.9  percent of  the housing loan applicants, yet were 7.4 
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Similarly, Asians, native Americans, and others accounted for 5.6 percent of  the housing 
loan applicants but only 2.1 percent of  the homeowners and 3.0  of  the households. 
Hispanics were more evenly represented:  6.6 percent of the applicants, 4.1 percent of 
the homeowners, and 6.4 percent of  the  household^?^ 
< 
It is also apparent that denial rates differ substantially by  race for all three types 
of loans (see table 2).  Denial rates for black applicants are about twice as high as those 
for white applicants, and for Hispanic applicants the rate is about 50 percent higher than 
for whites.  Other racial differences are also apparent, particularly with respect to black 
applicants.  Black applicants are more likely to be single and are more likely to apply for 
federally guaranteed loans.  In addition, a larger portion of  loans originated to black 
applicants are subsequently sold, and credit history is given as a reason for denial more 
often.  Furthermore, while the median income and loan amounts for black applicants are 
considerably lower than those for white applicants, the ratio of the two is fairly similar. 
In contrast, the ratio of  median loan amount to median income is consistently higher for 
Hispanic applicants than for the other two racial groups. 
111.  Results 
The parameter estimates for the denial rate regressions (equation [3]) are 
reported in tables 3, 4, and 5."  A positive coefficient &I  be interpreted as the 
expected increase in the probability that an applicant's loan would be denied resulting 
from a one-unit increase in the independent variable holding all other variables constant 
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race, for example, represent the expected difference in the probability that a white and 
black applicant with the same income, gender, FHA/VA status, loan amount, MSA, 
census tract, and lender will have their loan application denied.  Thus interpreted, the 
estimated black/white  (.103),  Hispanic/white (.040) and, to a lesser extent, the native 
Americanlwhite (.028)  and other racelwhite (.030)  differences for conventional home 
purchase loans are quite significant.  Differences are similar for FHA loans (.116,  .030, 
.028,  and .040, respectively).  There is little residual difference between Asian and white 
denial rates on home purchase loans (.008). 
Significant racial differences also exist for denial rates on refinance and home 
improvement loan applications.  Compared with home purchase applications, the 
blacklwhite difference is somewhat smaller for conventional refinance (.070)  and home 
improvement (.080)  loan applications.  The same is true of  the native American/white 
differences.  However, for Hispanic, Asian,  and other race applicants, differences from 
white denial rates for refinance and home improvement applications are larger than for 
home purchase applications.  Interestingly, while there is little residual difference 
between Asian and white denial rates on home purchase loan applications, the disparity 
is sizable for refinance (.039)  and home improvement (.054) applications --  comparable 
to the Hispanic/white differences. 
In the remainder of  this section, we focus on aggregate racial differences in denial 
rates.  Gross denial rate differences are expressed as the sum of  components 
representing differences in applicant characteristics (AC), neighborhood (TRACT), 
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for various applicant groups, components are averaged over all group members and 
expressed as percentages (by multiplying by  100) instead of fractions.  By  construction, 
these components must add up.  Thus,  for example, if 30 percent of an applicant group 
were denied, then the sum of  the average AC,  MSA, TRACT, and LENDER 
components and the average unexplained residual must equal 30 percent.  Similarly, the 
difference in the percentage denial rates for two groups must equal the sum of the 
differences in their components. 
Neighborhood,  MSA, and lender effects are taken directly from the estimated 
components, TRACT, MSA, and LENDER.  The component reflecting each applicant's 
economic characteristics, AC,  is computed using the coefficients from equation (3), 
assuming his or her race is white.  The unexplained residual is then computed for each 
applicant as the difference between the lender's action (DENIAL [I] or ACCEPT [O]) 
and the predicted lender action based on the sum of AC,  MSA, TRACT, and LENDER. 
It should be remembered that MSA, TRACT, and LENDER are normalized to have 
mean zero.  Since the applicant characteristics, AC,  are formed assuming the applicant is 
white, these normalizations imply that the unexplained residual for white applicants will 
be approximately, but not exactly, zero due to nonrandom distributions of white 
applicants a'cross tracts, lenders, and MSAs. 
Racial Differences in Denial Rates -  AU Neighborhoods 
The average applicant, lender, MSA,  neighborhood, and residual effects for 
black, Hispanic, Asian, native American, "other" race, white, and total applicants are 
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by themselves are not particularly meaningful; it is the differences between the racial 
groups that are of  interest.  As  summarized in table 1, for home purchase and re£inance 
loan applications, the unexplained residual makes up most of  the racial differences in 
percentage denial rates.  The residual accounts for two-thirds of the 16.3 percentage- 
point difference between black and white percentage desal rates on home purchase loan 
applications, and six-tenths of the 12.4 percent difference for refinance applications. 
While the Hispanic/white percentage denial rate differential is smaller (9.0  and 9.2 
percentage points on home purchase and refinances, respectively), the residual still 
accounts for a significant  portion of  the difference (four-tenths for home purchases and 
slightly over half for refinances).  The same is true for the other racial groups.  Census 
tract locations also contribute to the racial differences in percentage denial rates on 
home purchase and refinance applications, but the contribution is much less than the 
residual associated with the race of  the applicant. 
For home improvement loan applications, the picture is somewhat different. 
While the residual still accounts for over a third of the difference, disparities in applicant 
characteristics (including lender and MSA) account for a sizable portion of  the difference 
between white percentage denial rates and those for blacks and Hispanics.  Moreover, 
census tract location accounts for a large share of  the black/white differential. 
There are some other notable differences across the three types of  loans.  First, 
racial differences in percentage denial rates are least pronounced for refinance loan 
applications.  Second, for black applicants, the home purchase residual is larger than the 
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Asian applicants.  Finally, while the Asian percentage denial rate is virtually 
indistinguishable from the white percentage denial rate on home purchase applications, 
there are significant and largely unexplained differences between Asian and white 
percentage denial rates for the other loan products. 
Racial Differences in Denial Rates bv Neighborhood Income and Racial Compositiorl 
We now examine racial differences in percentage denial rates within and across 
census tracts, grouped on the basis of  average applicant income: high income (mean 
income of all applications for loans in the tract of  more than $60,000), middle income 
(mean income between $40,000 and $60,000) and low income (mean income of  less than 
$40,000); and racial composition:  primarily white (tracts with less than 10 percent 
nonwhite applicants), mixed (10 to 30 percent nonwhite applicants), and primarily 
minority (more than 30 percent nonwhite).  Percentage denial rates by  neighborhood 
income and by  neighborhood racial composition for black, Hispanic, Asian, and white 
applicants are given in columns 2 - 10 of  tables 6,7, and 8.  We report the percent of  the 
applications, the actual percentage denial rate, the portion attributable to applicant 
characteristics, MSA,  lender, census tract,  and the unexplained residual, for each for 
black, Hispanic, Asian, native American, white, and other race applicants, in each of  the 
nine types of neighborhoods. 
These tables reveal a remarkable persistence in the unexplained residual.  While 
the size of  the residual varies somewhat across loan type and across tracts that differ in 
mean income and racial composihon, it is always relatively large.  For black applicants, 
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across the nine types of  neighborhoods; for refinance and home improvement, the range 
is  only slightly lower -  6 to 12 percentage points.  For other minority groups, there is  a 
comparable persistence across neighborhoods in the unexplained residual. 
The tables also reveal a remarkable persistence in the census tract effects across 
racial groups.  For all racial groups, applications for properties in predo&tly  minority 
and  low-income neighborhoods have higher percentage denial rates than for those in 
predominantly white and high-income neighborhoods. 
While the overall impression is  one of  consistency, a few systematic differences 
are evident.  The difference between black and white percentage denial rates is lowest in 
primarily minority tracts, and in all neighborhoods the unexplained residual accounts for 
almost all of  the difference, though there is a tendency for it to decline with 
neighborhood income.  For Hispanics, on the other hand, the residual difference is 
slightly higher in the minority tracts and tends to increase with neighborhood income, 
though these patterns are weak.  We tend to focus on minority-white comparisons, but 
there are also interesting differences across the minority groups.  For example, in all but 
one type of  neighborhood (low-income-mixed tracts), our model predicts a lower 
percentage denial rate for blacks than Hispanics.  This lower predicted percentage denial 
rate, however, is swamped by the higher residuals for blacks, and as a result the overall 
percentage denial rates within each type of  neighborhood are 5 to 10 percentage points 
higher for black applicants. 
To examine the robustness of  these results, a number of  other comparisons were 
16 
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(table 10).  The sample was restricted by lender type (tables 11, 12, and 13). 
Neighborhoods were defined by  the percentage of applicants that were black (table 14) 
and Hispanic (table 15).  Data were also disaggregated by  MSA, with results presented 
for the top 25  MSAs and grouped for smaller ones (tables 16, 17, and 18).  In all cases, 
the results support the basic findings of  tables 6, 7, and 8. 
Despite the apparent thoroughness of  these robustness tests, there remains a 
concern that the validity of  each of these findings rests upon the appropriateness of  the 
same basic denial model, and our assumption that the form of  this model is  linear.  To 
examine this assumption, one final robustness test was employed.  Observations were 
grouped according to their predicted probability of  denial based on AC, MSA, and 
LENDER.  This could be considered a nonparametric rank-ordering of observations by 
risk (except for race and neighborhood).  Average differences in the blacklwhite and 
Hispanic/white unexplained residual and tract effects were then computed for each 
predicted denial probability group and are presented in tables 19 and 20.  By 
construction, within each group the sum of  the other predicted characteristics is the same 
for blacks and whites (or Hispanics and whites), so the sum of  the residual and tract 
racial differences must equal the differences in racial percentage denial rates. 
The linear probability model assumption implies that the differences in racial 
denial rates (and the residual and neighborhood subcomponents) should be consta.nt 
across risk groups.  If  the underlying model form were logistic or probit, then the 
differences would be increasing as the denial probability rose from zero to 50 percent. 
17 
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neighborhood group differences do rise when the denial probability increases from zero 
to 10 percent, they are fairly constant above that level.  This suggests that the linear 
probability model specification is no less appropriate than the logistic or probit model 
form. 
N.  Conclusions 
We find a persistent difference in the denial rates of  white and minority 
applicants, particularly blacks.  These differences remain even after lender, 
neighborhood, and applicant economic characteristics (as best we  can measure them with 
the HMDA data) are accounted for.  Moreover, we  find a remarkable degree of 
consistency in these conclusions across geographic markets and loan products, indicating 
that the observed racial differences in denial rates are widespread and cannot be 
attributed to a subset of  markets or type of  lender. 
It is by  now well known that the HMDA data do not contain enough relevant 
information about the loan applications to draw any firm conclusions regarding the 
reasons for these differences.  We  cannot determine whether these findings are 
generated by  a process of lender discrimination against minorities, because our residual 
differences may be due to credit histories, employment histories, loan-to-value ratios, 
wealth, or other factors that lenders consider in the loan evaluation process but that are 
not included in the HMDA file.  Because our analysis excludes these variables, we 
cannot conclude that the unexplained residual unambiguously stems from differential 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmtreatment based solely on the race of  the applicant.  There is some evidence in the 
HMDA data that these variables may be correlated with race, as witnessed by  the more 
prevalent citation of  credit history as a reason for denial for minorities (table 2).  Such a 
correlation could confound the estimation of  the pure racial effect. 
Despite this weakness of  the HMDA data, our analysis does shed some light on 
the reasons for observed differences in denial rates across racial groups and 
neighborhoods.  It has been argued that property location is an important source of 
racial differences in denial rates.  Because house value appreciation tends to be lower in 
low-income and minority neighborhoods, these areas are considered to be more risky 
from the lenders' point of  view.  Moreover, some lenders argue that appraisals are 
harder to conduct and interpret in low-income and minority neighborhoods, because the 
housing stock is generally older and more heterogeneous, and because appraisers are less 
familiar with these neighborhoods.12  Our analysis indicates that property location does 
contribute to racial differences in denial rates, but on average neighborhood effects are 
smaller than those stemming from applicant characteristics.  Moreover, when comparing 
similar applicants, racial differences in denial rates still exist and are roughly the same 
size within neighborhoods, regardless of the type of neighborhood. 
Since there are a number of  potential explanations for the racial differences we 
find in our residual denial rates, further study will  be necessary to pinpoint the causes. 
For example, one explanation could be that factors observed by  the lenders but not 
contained in our data are driving the results.  If  so, one would expect larger residual 
differences for home purchase loan denials than for refinance and home improvement 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmloans, because the latter applicants are a select group that has already received at least 
one loan -  the original home purchase loan.  We find some evidence that this is the 
case:  for black applicants, the residual denial rate is higher for home purchase loans 
than for refinances.  Interestingly, this pattern does not hold for Asian and Hispanic 
applicants; their residual denial rates are greater for refinances than for home purchase 
loans.  Moreover, for all  minority groups there are sizable unexplained residuals for 
> 
refinance and home improvement loan applications as well as for home purchase 
applications, suggesting that having once qualified for a new home loan brings little 
useful information to the regressions.  Exactly what kind of process could generate these 
outcomes for different credit products requires more thought. 
One possibly fruitful approach would be to pay more attention to the individual 
lenders and their characteristics.  In several previous studies (Avery, Beeson, and 
Sniderman [1992, 1993b]), we demonstrate that lenders are quite heterogeneous in terms 
of the propensities to attract and approve minority applicants, and that there appears to 
be little consistency either within or between lenders in their actions toward minorities. 
Theories regarding the operation of housing credit markets should exploit these £indings 
as part of  a general explanation of  the process generating the data 
Future studies of  the relationship between race and risk outcomes would also 
appear to be particularly important in order to shed light on the reasons for observed 
racial differences in our residuals.  If  the patterns we observe are due to discrimination 
by lenders, and such discrimination takes the form of  a higher risk threshold for 
minorities, then we would expect loans granted to black applicants to perform better 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmthan those granted to whites, ceteris paribus.  Given the findings of  this study, such 
examinations would seem very important.  At the same time, we  are cautious about the 
power of  such hypothesis tests.  Several different explanations for significant racial 
intercepts can be observationally equivalent, making it very difficult to claim persuasively 
that any one process adequately accounts for the variations in the data.  Accordingly, 
careful attention to distinguishing among competing hypotheses through choice of  data 
and modeling strategies seems especially important. 
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1.  See, for example, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
of 1975, which prohibit lenders from discriminating against individual loan applicants on the 
basis of  race or ethnic origin, gender, and other factors.  The latter law also prohibits the 
explicit use of  such variables in credit screening, even if cost-related.  Also, the Community 
Reinvestment Act of  1977 requires that depository institutions help meet the credit needs 
of their communities, including low-income and minority areas, in a manner consistent .with 
safe and sound banking. 
2. Canner (1981), Avery and Buynak (1981), Avery and Canner (1983), and .Bradbury, Case, 
and  Dunham  (1989)  contrast  the  differences in mortgage  credit  originations between 
predominantly white and predominantly minority neighborhoods in various MSAs.  These 
studies use either pre-1990 HMDA data or lien title data to infer from the neighborhoods' 
characteristics whether mortgage lenders treat neighborhoods differently depending on their 
racial  composition  Calem  (1992)  contrasts  the  experiences  of  individual  lenders 
participating in  a  Philadelphia  area  mortgage-lending  plan  with  those  who  did  not 
participate. His paper does document the existence of lender differences in the penetration 
of  minority communities, but the primary focus is  on the characteristics of  the voluntary 
mortgage plan operated by a group of lenders.  Avery (1989) notes the differences between 
studies based  on lending in a  neighborhood  and  the  lending procedures  adopted by 
individual lenders. 
3.  Two exceptions are King (1980) and Schafer and Ladd (1981), which find little evidence 
of neighborhood redlining but some evidence of higher denial rates for black and Hispanic 
applicants, after controlling for all  available information on other factors, such as income 
and credit history, relevant to the lending decision.  While quite informative, these studies 
are limited in their geographic coverage and in the number and types of  lenders surveyed. 
In  addition,  there  have  been  several  studies  that  use  household-level  data  without 
neighborhood effects.  Canner, Gabriel, and Wooley (1991), Gabriel and Rosenthal(1991), 
and  Duca  and  Rosenthal  (1992)  study  racial  aspects  of  credit  rationing and  market 
performance by  using  data from the  Survey  of  Consumer Finances,  which  comprises 
information collected from a sample of households.  These studies attempt to infer from the 
households'  experiences and demographic characteristics whether  lenders treat  people 
differently as a result of their racial status.  Canner and,  Luckett (1991) do not consider race, 
but do discuss factors associated with consumer and mortgage debt payment problems. 
4.  The  model  was  actually  estimated  using  deviations  about  the  means,  which  is 
computationally  equivalent  to  adding  intercepts.  For  the  new  purchase  sample, the 
1,984,688 observations were located in 607,631 unique combinations of the 40,008 tracts and 
20,695 lenders in the sample spread across 340 MSAs; #us,  the average tract had about 15 
lenders, each of  whom served about 30 tracts per MSA.  For the refinancing sample, the 
716,595 observations were located in 326,535 unique combinations of  tracts and lenders. 
For the home improvement loan sample, the 787,951 observations were located in 267,158 
unique combinations of  tract and lender. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfm5. Mortgage banks are considered to have an office in an MSA if  they take five or more 
mortgage  applications  there.  There  is  some  evidence  that  a  significant  portion  of 
applications to mortgage bankers,  perhaps as high  as 30 percent, may  not  have  been 
reported  in HMDA for  1990 and  1991 because  firms fell below  the $10 million  asset 
requirement. This may be particularly true for firms  serving primarily as originators, selling 
loans in the secondary market.  In November 1991, the Federal Reserve Board tightened 
the reporting requirements for mortgage banks, which should increase coverage. 
6.  Institutions with assets of less than $30 million were not required to report race, income, 
and gender for loan applicants.  In addition, the HMDA figs  contained many errors and 
inconsistencies even after extensive editing by the receiving agencies. We dealt with missing 
and implausible data using a "hot deck" imputation procedure similar to that used by  the 
U.S.  Census Bureau.  Applications  with  missing  or implausible data were  statistically 
matched to applications for the same type of loan in the same census tract that came closest 
to them in reported characteristics (race, loan action, income, and loan amount).  Missing 
values were filled in using the variable value of  the matched observation.  Overall, income 
was imputed for 4.9  percent, loan amount for 1.5 percent, gender for 4.0  percent, and race 
for 5.6 percent of the study sample applications. 
7.  Applications were omitted from our sample for the following reasons:  loans purchased 
from other institutions (1,137,741) because they did not require an action by  the reporting 
lender;  applications for properties outside the MSAs in which the lender had an office 
(1,523,429  loans)  because  of  inconsistent  reporting  requirements;  applications  for 
multifamily homes and those that never reached the stage of  lender action because they 
were either withdrawn by  the applicant or closed for incompleteness (444,684). 
8.  The 8,745 financial institutions filing 1990 HMDA reports that had at least one loan in 
the study sample operated in an average of  2.7  MSAs.  This translated into 23,248 study 
lenders when lenders were defined at the MSA level. 
9.  Household  income  of  sample applicants may  be  higher  than  this  figure,  since the 
applicant's income used for mortgage qualification may not reflect all of the income received 
by  the household. 
10.  The percent Hispanic in the HMDA sample is slightly higher than the overall U.S. 
population, due in part to the inclusion of  Puerto Rico, and the percent black is slightly 
lower.  U.S.  figures are taken from the whole 1990 Census, which may differ somewhat from 
the coverage of  the study sample, in that rural areas we included. 
11. The reported standard errors in tables 3, 4,  and 5 are those from a standard regression 
program.  These may be biased due to heteroskedasticity stemming from the fact that the 
underlying model is a linear probability model. 
12. See Lang and Nakamura (1993) for more discussion on this point. 
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http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 1:  Characteristics  of Mortgage Applications. National Sample, 1990 HMDA 
Home  Purchase- 
Percent Percent Denial  Pacent Percent Denial  Percent Percent Denial 
Sample Loan$  Rate  Sample Loans  Rate  Sample Loan$  Rate 
Race ofApp1icanr 
Native American  0.6%  0.6%  19.3%  0.6%  0.6%  21.2%  0.9%  1.0%  22.7% 
Asian (or Pacifrc Islander)  4.6  6.8  14.4  4.9  7.2  21.3  2.5  5.4  27.7 
Black  6.2  4.8  29.4  5.1  3.9  28.8  10.3  5.9  43.4 
wc  6.6  6.4  22.1  7.7  73  25.6  5.7  5.4  35.4 
white  81.4  80.5  13.1  80.9  79.9  16.4  79.9  81.3  20.3 
Other  0.7  1.0  19.8  0.7  1.0  26.8  0.8  1.0  35.4 
Race of  Co-applicant 
No Co-applicant  28.4  24.1  17.3  24.8  23.8  21.0  33.5  26.3  29.8 
Same Race as Applicant  69.4  73.4  13.8  73.2  73.9  17.1  64.9  71.6  20.8 
Different Race than Applicant  2.2  2.5  15.6  2.0  23  19.4  1.6  2.1  21.1 
Gender 
Male Applicant. Female Co-applicant  64.0  682  13.4  67.7  692  16.8  58.0  65.8  19.7 
Female Applican~  Male Co-applicant  4.3  4.2  18.6  4.9  42  21.4  6.9  6.1  28.6 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  2.0  2.3  16.4  1.6  20  19.6  0.8  1.0  27.8 
Female Applicant and &applicant  1.2  1.2  18.1  0.9  0.8  20.2  0.8  0.8  28.1 
Single Male Applicant  16.9  15.6  17.9  14.7  15.7  22.0  195  16.3  29.5 
Single Female Applicant  115  8.5  16.5  10.1  8.1  19.6  14.0  9.9  30.1 








Loan Accepted and Withdrawn 
Loan Originated 
Loan Kept by Originator (% of originations) 
Loan Sold to FNMA (% of originations) 
Loan Sold to GNMA (% of originations) 
Loan Sold to FHLMC (% of originations) 
Loan Sold Elsewhere (8  of originations) 
Reasons  for Denial (of  bans  ~enied)' 








Mongage Insurance Denied 
Other 
Memo Ifem: 
Median Income (S 1.000s) 
Median Loan Request ($1.000~) 
Number of Loans 
Up to three  reasons for denial could be given, and kwers  were voluntary. Each category gives the percent of all  denials that 
gave that reason  as one of the three. 
SOURCZ FOR  ALL  TABLES: Authol'~. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 2:  Characteristics  of ~ort~a~e  Applications by Race. National Sample. 1990 HMDA 
Home  Refinance  Home lmorovement 
Black Hispanic White  Black Hispanic White  Black Hispanic White 
Gender 
Two Applicants 
Single Male Applicant 
Single Female Applicant 






h  Denied 
h  Accepted and Withdrawn 
-  horiginatkl 
Loan Kept by Originator (% of originations) 
Loan Sold to FNMA  (% of originations) 
Loan  Sold to GNMA (% of originations) 
Loan  Sold to FHLMC (96 of originations) 
h  Sold Elsewhere  (% of originations) 
Reasons  for  Denial (of  Loans Denied)' 








Mortgage Insurance Denied 
Other 
Memo Iremr: 
Median Income ($1,000s)  $36  $44  $48  $47  $50  $56  $27  $35  $40 
Median Loan  Request ($1,000~)  $61  $85  $76  $71  $100  $79  $5  $11  $10 
Up  to three reasons for denial could be giuen. and answers were voluntary.  Each category gives the percent of all denials that 
gave that reason as one of the three. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 3:  Linear Probability Model of Loan Denial (I)  or Acepawe (0). Home Purchase 
Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
Race (Dummies, 'WhiteWls  Base Group) 
Black Applicant 
Hispanic Applicant 
Native American Applicant 
Asii  Applicant 
Other Race Applicant 
Mixed Race, Minority Co-applicant (Dummy)  .024 10"' 
Mixed Race. Nonminority Co-applicant (Dummy)  -0.02690"' 
Owner-occupied (Dummy)  .00630'" 
Income ($1,000'~) 
Income 
Income Spline at 1620.000 
Income Spline  at $40.000 
Income Spline at $60.000 
Income Spline at $80.000 
Income Spline  at $100,000 
Income Spline  at $150.000 
Income Spline at $200,000 
Loan Amounr ($I,Ws) 
Loan  Amount 
Loan Amount Spline at $20.000 
Loan Amount Spline at $40,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $60.000 
Loan Amount Spline at $80.000 
Loan Amount Spline at $100.000 
Loan Amount Spline at $125,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $200,000 
Loon-to-Income Ratio (Dummies,  LESS fhan I5  Is Base Group) 
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0  -0.01016'" 
Ratio of 2.0 to 2.25  -0.0 1168"' 
Ratio of 2.25 to 2.5  -0.01  195"' 
Ratio of 2.5 to 2.75  -0.00737"' 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0  .00323 
Ratio over 3.0  ,05062"' 
Applicant Gender (Dummies.  Female Applicant, No Co-applicant Is Base Croup) 
Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant  -0.01886- 
Female Applicant. Male Co-applicant  -0.00766 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  -0.00390 
Female Applicant and Co-applicant  -0.01021 
Male Applicanl. No Co-applicant  .02834"' 
Income. Interacted With  No Co-applicant 
Income 
Income Spline at $20.000 
lncome Spline at $40.000 
lncome Spline at $60,000 
lncome Spline at $80,000 
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Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
Race and Marital Status. Interacted With VA  Loan 
Black Applicant  -0.00667 
Hispanic Applicant  -0.00866 
Native American Applicant  .04929' 
Asian Applicant  .01699 
White Applicant  -0.02033 
Other Race Applicant  .02562 
No Co-applicant  -0.00619' 
Race and Marital Stafus. Interacted With FHA  Loan 
Black Applicant  -0.01967 
Hispanic Applicant  -0.04312" 
Native American Applicant  .W29 
Asian Applicant  -0.03294' 
White Applicant  -0.03329' 
Other Race Applicant  -0.02377 
No Co-applicant  -0.01230"' 
Income, Interacted With VA or FHA  Loan 
Income 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60.000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at  $100,000 
Loan Amount, Interacted With VA  or FHA  Loan 
Loan Amount  .00366"' 
Loan Amount Spline at $20,000  -0.00256'" 
Loan  Amount Spline at $40.000  -0.0023 1"' 
Loan  Amount Spline at $60.000  .OOO66' 
Loan Amount Spline at $80.000  -0.00038 
Loan Amount Spline at $100,000  .00052 
Loan-to-Income Ratio. Interacted With VA or FHA  Loan 
Ratio of  1.5  to 2.0  -0.00333 
Ratio of 2.0  to 2.25  -0.005  1  1 
Ratio of 2.25  to 2.5  -0.00612 
Ratio of 2.5 to 2.75  .OOO29 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0  -0.00449 
Ratio over 3.0  -0.00681 
Memo Item: 
Number of Observations  1984.688 
Mean  Denial Rate in Regression Sample  .I48 
Number of TracVInstitution Dummies  607.631 
R squared (Including  Tractllnstitution Dummies)  A56  ' 
R squared (Variation around Tracthtitution Means)  .022 
Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
"Significant at the 1 percent level. 
"'Signific,ant  at the 0.1  percent level. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 4:  Linear Probability Model of Loan Denial (1) a  Acqmnce  (0). Refmce 
Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
Race (Dummies. 'While"  Is  Base Group) 
Black Applicant 
Hispanic Applicant 
Native American Applicant 
Asii  Applicant 
Other Race  Applicant 
Mixed Race.  Minority Co-applicant (Dummy)  .  .00576 
Mixed Raix. Nonminority Co-applicant (Dummy)  -0.02336" 
Ownex-oczupied (Dummy) 
VA Loan  (Dummy) 
Income ($1 IXX)'s) 
Income 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at S40.000 
Income Spline at W.000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100,000 
Income Spline at $150,000 
Income Spline at WO.000 
Loan Amounr ($1 W's) 
Loan Amount 
Loan Amount Spline at $20,000 
Loan Amount Spline at  $40,000 
Loan Amount Spline at W.000 
Loan Amount Spline at $80,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $100.000 
Loan Amount Spline at $125.000 
Loan  Amount Spline at O2Ml.000 
Loan-&-Income Ratio (Dummies. Less than 15  Is  Base Group) 
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0  -0.00218 
Ratio of 2.0 to 2.25  .0045 1 
Ratio of 2.25  to 2.5  .00700' 
Ratio of 2.5 to 2.75  .01506"' 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0  .02567"' 
Ratio over 3.0  .08614"' 
Applicant Gender (Dumtdes,  Female Applicant. No Co-applicanf  Is Base Group) 
Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant  -0.09269"' 
Female Applicant, Male Co-applicant  -0.08497"' 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  -0.06650"' 
Female Applicant and Cbapplicant  4.08148"' 
Male Applicant, No Co-applicant  .024n"' 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 4:  (continued) 
Income. Interacted With No  Co-applicant 
Income 
Income Spline at $20.000 
Income Spline at $40.000 
Income Spline at %60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100.000 
Interacted With VA or FHA Loan 
Black Applicant 
Hispanic Applicant 
Native American Applicant 
Mi  Applicant 
White Applicant 





Number of Observations 
Mean Denial Rate in Regression Sample 
Number of TractlInstitution Dummies 
R squared (Including Tracthstitution Dummies) 
R squared (Variation around Tracthstitution Means) 
Parameter Esrimate  Standard Error 
'  Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
"  Significant at the 1 percent level. 
"'Significant  at the 0.1 percent level. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 5: Linear Robability Model of Loan Denial (I)  or Acceptance (0). Home Impmvement 
Parametex Estimate  Standard Error 
Race (Dummies. 'White" Is  Base Group) 
Black Applicant 
Hispanic Applicant 
Native American Applicant 
Asii  Applicant 
Other Race  Applicant 
Mixed Race. Minority Co-applicant (Dummy)  .00107 
Mixed Race. Nonminority Co-applicant (Dummy)  -0.04042"' 
Owner-occupied (Dummy) 
VA Loan W~Y) 
Income ($1,000'~) 
Income 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $  100,000 
Income Spline at $150.000 
Income Spline at $200,000 
Loan Amount ($1,0005) 
Loan  Amount 
Loan Amount Spline at $20.000 
Loan  Amount Spline  at $40.000 
Loan  Amount Spline  at IF60.000 
Loan Amount Spline at $80,000 
Loan  Amount Spline  at $100.000 
Loan Amount Spline at $125,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $200.000 
Loan-to-Income  Ratio (Dummies. Less than 15 Is  Base Group) 
Ratio of 1.5  to 2.0  -0205  1 "' 
Ratio of 2.0  to 2.25  .00433"' 
Ratio of 2.25 to 2.5  .02663' 
Ratio of 2.5  to 2.75  .05256"' 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0  .08344"' 
Ratio over 3.0  .04087"' 
Applicant Gender (Dummies,  Fema!e Applicant,  No Co-applicanl  Is Base Group) 
Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant  -0.10888"' 
Female Applicant. Male Co-applicant  -0.07293"' 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  -0.04480"' 
Female Applicant and Co-applicant  -0.07792"' 
Male Applicant, No Co-applicant  .03575"' 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 5:  (continued) 
Parameter Eslimate  Standard Fmr 
Income. Interacted With No  Co-applicant 
Income 
Income Spline at $20.000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80.000 
Income Spline at  $100.000 
Interacted  With VA or FHA Loan 
Black Applicant 
Hispanic Applicant 
Native American Applicant 
Asii  Applicant 
White Applicant 





Number of Observations 
Mean Denial Rate in Regression Sample 
Number of TracUInstitution  Dummies 
R squared (Including TracUInstitution Dwnmies)  A73 
R squared (Variation around TractlInstitution Means)  .on 
Signir~cant  at the 5 percent level. 
"  Significant at  the 1  percent level. 
"'Significant  at the 0.1 percent level. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 6:  Difkwce in Average Percentage Denial Rates Attributable to Various Sources. Home Purchase Loans, by 
Neighborhood and Race, 1990 HMDA 
Total  -MiddleIncome'  w-  -7  White4Mixedsndty6  WhisMix%in3 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Black 
Actual Denial Rate 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics 
MSA Effect  ' 
Ovd  Lender Effect 
Ccnsus Tract Effect 
Residual' 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics  100.0  3.4  13.9  26.5  3.3  10.1  22.0  1.3  3.7  15.8 
Actual Denial Rate  22.1  17.4  19.1  20.0  19.6  205  22.1  24.6  27.8  28.9 
Applicant Economic 
Charactaistics  14.8  12.6  13.0  13.1  14.0  14.5  14.4  17.1  18.4  19.6 
MSA Effect  2.0  0.8  1.9  3.0  -0.4  1.3  23  -0.3  0.6  1.7 
Ovd  Lender Effect  0.1  1.6  0.6  -0.9  0.8  0.6  -0.8  1.0  1.5  1.4 
Census Tract Effect  1.4  -1.5  -0.6  1.4  -0.4  0.6  28  0.8  1.6  3.0 
Residual7  3.7  3.8  4.2  3.4  5.6  3.4  3.4  6.0  5.8  3.2 
Asian Applicants 
Percent of  Asians  100.0  6.3  25.8  36.6  4.7  8.5  12.4  1.4  2.1  22 
Actual Denial Rate  14.4  10.3  13.5  14.5  11.9  13.9  17.7  13.1  17.3  20.9 
Applicant Economic 
Chamctaistics  13.0  121  12.6  12.7  12.8  13.1  13.6  16.3  16.4  16.7 
MSA  Effect  0.6  -0.4  0.9  1.0  -1.3  -0.1  0.9  -1.3  -0.2  0.2 
Ovd  Lender Effect  -0.2  -0.2  0.2  -0.4  -0.6  -0.7  -0.0  -1.4  -0.4  -0.3 
Census Tract Effect  -0.0  -1.9  -1.3  0.4  -0.5  0.0  2.2  0.0  1.2  2.1 
Residual'  1  .O  0.7  1.2  0.8  1.6  1.6  1.0  -0.5  0.3  2.2 
Native American Applicants 
Percent of Native Americans 100.0  13.1  20.6  10.0  16.2  123  7.2  8.8  7.1  4.8 
Actual Denial Rate  19.3  14.9  14.6  19.3  17.3  19.3  24.6  22.9  26.6  33.3 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  14.4  12.9  12.5  12.8  14.6  14.4  14.1  17.8  18.0  18.9 
USA  Etkt  0.3  -0.4  1.1  1.7  -1.1  0.1  1.4  -0.8  0.6  0.8 
Overall Lender Effect  1.1  0.3  1.0  1.3  0.6  0.7  -0.2  1.3  2.8  4.3 
Census Tract Effect  0.1  -1.7  -1.2  0.5  -0.6  -0.0  2.8  1.0  2.6  4.2 
Residual7  3.4  3.8  1.1  3.1  3.8  4.1  6.5  3.6  2.6  4.9 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 6: (continued) 
Total 
Other Race Applicants 
Percent of Other Race  100.0%  10.9%  26.8%  15.8%  9.2%  11.9%  14.8%  3.0%  3.1%  4.5% 
Actual Denial Rate  19.8  16.3  18.1  22.4  14.9  18.1  24.3  21.3  24.1  25.1 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  14.0  12.5  12.9  13.4  13.3  13.8  15.7  16.3  17.3  18.6 
MA  Effect  1.1  -0.1  1.3  2.2  -1.0  0.3  2.6  -0.7  -0.1  1.4 
Overall Lender Effect  0.7  1.2  1.1  0.8  0.0  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.6  -0.4 
Census Tract Effect  0.2  -1.6  -1.3  1.0  -0.6  0.2  2.5  0.8  2.2  3.3 
Residual7  3.8  4.2  4.0  4.9  3.2  3.1  3.1  4.6  4.1  2.2 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites  100.0  18.9  16.2  3.9  26.3  11.1  27  13.5  5.2  2.1 
Actual Denial Rate  13.1  9.5  12.2  15.6  11.0  13.4  18.0  17.0  20.0  23.7 
Applicant Economic 
Charactexistics  13.6  12.0  12.4  12.6  13.3  13.5  13.5  16.6  17.1  17.3 
MA  Effect  -0.2  -0.4  1  1.9  -1.3  0.2  1.0  -0.9  0.3  0.7 
Overall Lender Effect  -0.0  -0.4  -0.1  0.0  -0.3  -0.4  0.5  0.6  12  1.3 
Census Tract Effect  -0.3  -1.7  -1.2  0.6  -0.6  0.1  2.2  0.8  1.7  3.9 
Residual'  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.5  -0.1  -0.1  0.7  -0.01  -0.4  0.5 
Total Applicants 
Percent of Applicants  100.0  16.2  16.1  7.4  22.3  10.9  5.7  11.4  5.2  4.8 
Actual Denial Rate  14.8  9.9  13.1  17.4  11.3  14.8  21.2  17.2  22.0  28.7 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  13.8  12.1  12.5  12.8  13.3  13.7  14.0  16.6  17.3  18.1 
MA  Effect  0.0  -0.4  1.1  1.9  -1.3  0.3  1.1  -0.9  0.4  0.5 
Overall Lender  Effect  0.0  -0.3  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.1  0.5  1.3  0.9 
Census Tract Effect  0.0  -1.7  -1.1  0.9  -0.6  0.2  25  0.8  1.7  4.1 
Residual7  1.0  02  0.7  2.0  0.2  1.0  3.7  0.2  1.4  5.2 
Census tracts with mean applicant income of more. than  $60.000. 
'Census  tracts with mean applicant income greater than $40.000 and less than or equal to $60,000. 
'  Census tracts with mean applicant income of $40.000  or less. 
'  Census aacts with less than 10 percent minority applicants (native Americans. Asii.  Blacks. Hispanics. or other). 
'  Census tracts with 10 percent or more. and 30  percent or less applications from minority applicants. 
Census tram with more lhan 30  percent of all loan applications from minority applicants. 
'The  residual is defd  as the average difference between the actual denial rate and the sum of the economic. MSA, tract. and lender 
effects. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 7:  Diffeenee  in Average Percenrage Denial Rates Auributable to Various Sources. Refmcc  Loans.  by Neighbohood 
and Race. 1990 HMDA 
REFINANCE 
Black Applicants 
Percent of  Blacks  100.0% 
Actual Denial Rate  28.8 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  18.0 
MSA Effect  0.1 
Overall Lender Effect  -0.4 
Census Tract Effect  3.4 
~esidual~  7.6 
Hispanic Applicants 
Pemt  of Hispanics  100.0 
Actual Denial Rate  25.6 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  17.9 
MSA Effect  1.4 
Overall Lender Effect  -0.3 
Census Tract Effect  1.6 
Residual7  4.9 
Asian Applicants 
Percent of  Asians  100.0 
Actual Denial Rate  21.3 
Applicant Economic 
Charactexistics  18.3 
MSA Effect  -1.0 
Overall Lender Effect  -0.0 
Census Tract Effect  0.2 
Residual7  3 9 
Native American Applicants 
Percent of  Native American.  100.0 
Actual Denial Rate  21.2 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  17.8 
MSA Effect  0.4 
Overall Lender Effect  0.0 
Census Tract Effect  0.3 
Residual'  2.7 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 7: (continued) 
Other Race Applicants 
Percent of Other Race 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Total Applicants 
Percent of Applicants 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
' ' '  ' '  See notes for table 6. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 8:  Difference in Average Percentage Denial Rates Atmbutabk to Variw  Sources. Home Improvement Lorn. by Neighborhood 
and Race. 1990 HMDA 
Total  Middle-  Low- 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Bkks 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census  Tract Effect 
Residual' 
Hispanic Appliconts 
Percent of Hispanics 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual' 
Asion Appliconts 
Percent of Asians 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual' 
Notive American Applicants 
Percent of Native Americans 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual' 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 8: (continued) 
Other Race Applicants 
Percent of Other Race 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual' 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Total  Applicants 
Percent of Appicants 




Overall Lender Effect 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
'  '  See notes for table 6. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 9:  Difference in Average Percentage Denial Rates Attributable to Various Sourn,  Center City, by  Neighborhood 
and Race. 1990 HMDA 
Total  Middle-  LowIncome'  %-7  White4h4ixedJMinoritf  White4MixedJMinority'' 
Black Applicants 
mnt  of Blacks  100.0%  2.1%  4.7%  7.8%  3.3%  8.7%  20.7% 
Actual Denial Rate  31.2  26.2  28.3  28.8  21.0  28.1  29.5 
Census Tract Effect  3.1  1.9  -0.2  3.3  -1.2  0.9  3.3 
~esidual'  13.4  11.0  12.5  9.7  14.0  12.3  10.1 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics  100.0  2.3  10.1  215  23  8.9  24.7 
Actual Denial Rate  23.8  17.6  21.0  21.8  202  20.7  23.4 
Census Tract Effect  2.2  -1.8  -0.5  28  -0.8  0.6  3.1 
~esidual~  3.8  3.9  5.4  3.4  6.1  3.8  3.6 
White  Applicants 
Percent of Whites  100.0  15.3  15.6  4.7  212  125  4.2 
Actual Denial Rate  13.9  9.8  13.1  16.6  10.6  135  18.2 
Census Tract Effect  -0.1  -1.9  -1.0  1.5  1.1  02  2.7 
Residual7  -0.0  -0.1  -0.2  0.3  -0.1  -0.1  0.5 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks  100.0  1.5  6.9  255  1.7  4.1  29.7 
Actual Denial Rate  29.6  28.7  29.7  25.6  24.6  35.8  26.9 
Census Tract Effect  4.2  -1.8  -0.9  3.3  -0.3  2.4  4.4 
Residual7  7.5  11.6  11.4  6.2  8.5  13.6  6.0 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of  Hispanics  100.0  2.0  15.4  41.0  1.0  4.3  24.5 
Actual Denial Rate  26.1  25.8  22.9  25.2  31.3  29.9  26.8 
Census Tract Effect  2.6  -2.6  -1.1  3.5  -0.3  1.4  2.9 
~esidud  4.8  6.2  4.0  4.4  8.6  6.2  5.4 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites  100.0  16.3  25.4  10.1  16.5  9.1  5.1 
Actual Denial Rate  17.5  14.8  18.6  20.3  12.9  18.1  21.7 
Census Tract Effect  -0.1  -2.9  -1.4  1.9  -1.2  0.9  3.5 
Residual7  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  -0.0  -0.4  0.3 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks  100.0%  0.9%  2.4%  5.0%  1.5%  3.8%  14.0% 
Actual Denial Rate  45.1  31.5  34.5  38.6  31.4  35.3  42.4 
Census Tract Effect  7.5  -3.2  1.1  4.4  -1.2  ,  1.0  5.8 
Residual7  7.6  12.1  9.4  6.8  11.4  10.5  6.9 
Hispanic Applicanrs 
Percent of Hispanics  100.0  1.6  8.7  15.5  1.8  7.3  20.9 
Actual Denial Rate  38.6  27.8  31.6  35.8  30.5  34.7  39.5 
Census Tract Effect  2.5  -4.3  -1.9  3.4  -1.6  ' -0.4  27 
Residual7  6.5  7.7  7.5  5.9  6.7  ,  7.1  7.4 
While Applicants 
Percent of Whites  100.0  .  11.3  127  4.4  19.4  10.5  4.5 
Actual Denial Rate  22.7  15.6  21.2  27.3  15.8  23.2  32.0 
Census Tract Effect  0.5  -3.5  -1.9  2.5  -1.9  1.0  4.3 
Residud  0.0  -0.1  -0.0  0.6  -0.1  '  -0.3  0.2 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 10:  Difference in Avenge Percentage Denid Rates Attributable to Various Sources, Non-Center City, by Neighborhood 
and Rqce. 1990 HMDA 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual' 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 




Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White  Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual~ 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate. 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual~ 
White  Applicants 
Percent of  Whites 
Achlal Ik~d  Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual~ 
' '  '  '  See notes for table 6. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 11:  Difference in Average Percentage Denial Rates Attributable to Various Sources, Commercial Banks, 
by Neighborhood and Race,  1990 HMDA 
Total  Middle-  Low- 
White'Mu~d'Minority~  WhidMixedsMinority6 
Black Applicanu 
Percent of Blacks  100.0%  3.2%  6.1%  6.6%  5.2%  10.9%  21.8%  3.1%  9.2%  33.9% 
Actual Denial Rate  31.8  23.6  26.3  33.3  28.0  28.7  29.1  35.0  35.3  35.5 
Census Tract Effect  ,  2.6  -1.7  -0.5  3.1  -0.6  0.6  2.6  .  0.8  2.1  4.7 
Residual7  11.4  10.9  10.9  10.9  126  12.4  10.0  14.6  12.5  11.5 
Hispanic Applicanls  , 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 




Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual' 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 12:  Difference in Average Percentage Denial Rates Attributable to Various Sources. Mt  Institutions, 
by  Neighborhood and Race, 1990 HMDA 
Tolal  Hieh IncomL  Middlfdmmd-  Low- 
~hite~Mixed~~in&t~~  White4Mixed5Minority6  White4Mixed5@ority6 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual' 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual' 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual' 
White  Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Mal  Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
' '  '  See notes for table 6. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 13:  Diffmnce in Average Percentage Denial Rates Ataibutable to  Various Sources.  Mongage Banks. 
by Neighborhood and Race,  1990 HMDA 
Total  -L4!dudIncome' 
Black Applicants 
~ekent  of Blacks 
Acmal Denial Rate 
Gms Tract Effect 
~esidual~ 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White  Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 




Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual' 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White Applicants 
Percent of  Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White Applicanfs 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidual~ 
-  - 
' '  See notes for table 6. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 14:  Difference in Average Percentage Denial Rates. Neighborhoods Soned by  Percentage Black.  1990 HMDA 
Total  I  le  m  Low- 
Whiz  %ix?Bl$~  White'  Mixeds Black6 
Black Applicants 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White  Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 




Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White  Applicants 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 14: (continued) 
Total  Lowlncomd 
White'  Mixed' Black6 
Black Applicants 
Percent of  Blacks  100.0%  3.6%  4.8%  3.8%  3.2%  8.4%  13.8%  2.1%  8.2%  52.1% 
Actual Denial Rate  43.4  29.1  35.2  38.5  32.4  36.7  44.1  35.2  38.5  48.1 
Census Tract Effect  6.3  -2.5  -0.2  4.0  -1.5  1.5  6.8  0.3  3.6  9.5 
Residual7  8.0  7.9  8.9  6.4  10.1  10.2  7.1  9.4  9.8  7.4 
Hispanic Applicanis 
Percent of  Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
~esidu& 
White Applicanfs 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
~esiduap 
'  Census sacs with mean applicant income of more than $60,000. 
'Census aacts with mean a~ulicant  income greater than  $40,000 and less than  or equal to $60,000. 
)Census rracts with mean applicant income if  $40.000 or less. 
Census hacts with less Ihan 5 percent black applicants. 
'Census mas with 5 percent or more and 25 percent or less applications from bhck applicants. 
Census hacts with more than  25 percent of all loan applications from black applicants. 
'The  residual is defmed as the average difference between the actual denial rate and the sum of the economic. USA, hact, and lender 
effects. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 15:  Difference in Average Percentage Denial Rates. Neighborhoods Soned by  Percentage Hispanic.  1990 HMDA 
Total  Middle-  Low- 
WhidMixed'Hi@c6  White4Mixed'Hispanic6  White4Mixed'Hispanic6 
Block Appliconts 
Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White Appliconts 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 




Percent of Blacks 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
H:spanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
White  Appliconts 
Percent of Whites 
Actual Denial Rate 
Census Tract Effect 
Residual7 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable IS: (continued) 
Tod  Lowv 
White'%x:e$  Whiz~Ets  White4Mired'Minority6 
Black Applicants 
Percent of  Blacks  100.0%  6.7%  4.3%  1.2%  17.6%  6.0%  1.7%  54.8%  6.4%  1.3% 
Ac~al  Denial Rate  43.4  33.4  35.2  37.8  39.3  43.0  39.5  46.0  48.7  51.0 
Census Tmct Effect  6.3  -0.9  1.6  4.2  3.4  5.5  5.3  8.2  9;s  9.0 
Residual7  8.0  8.8  6.9  5.4  9.2  7.8  3.9  7.8  7.5  7.2 
Hispanic Applicants 
Percent of Hispanics  100.0  5.0  17.5  13.4  3.7  11.9  14.6  2.6  6.2  25.3 
Ac~al  Denial Rate  35.4  27.6  31.4  33.1  27.6  37.3  37.8  32.6  42.0  38.4 
Census Tract Effect  1.4  -2.1  -0.3  1.0  -1.3  1.7  2.0  2.5  5.8  2.1 
Residual7  6.2  5.5  6.3  5.3  5.1  6.9  7.3  5.2  5.8  6.0 
White Applicants 
Percent of Whites  100.0  21.8  9.7  1.0  32.4  5.9  0.9  24.7  2.8  0.8 
Ac~al  Denial Rate  Zll.3  17.3  22.4  25.9  17.4  27.4  29.8  21.6  32.6  36.8 
Census Tract Effect  -0.9  -3.1  -0.8  0.3  -1.8  0.9  2.2  0.7  4.5  4.2 
Residual7  -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.8  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.0  -0.0  0.3 
'  Census uacts with mean applicant income of more than $60.000. 
Census tmcts with mean applicant income greater than  $40,000  and less than or equal to $60.000. 
'Census mts  with mean applicant income of $40,000  or less. 
Census mts  with less than 5 percent Hispanic applicants. 
'Census mts  with 5 percent or more and 25 percent or less applications from Hispanic applicants. 
Census traas  with more than  25 percent of all loan applications from Hispanic applicants. 
The residual is defmd  as the average difference between the acNal denial rate and the sum of the economic. MSA, tracL and lender 
effects. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 16:  Neighbohood and Unexplained Denial Rate Residuals, Blacks, by MSA, 1990 HMDA 
Home Purchase  Refinance  Home lmorovement 
Percent Denial  Tract Residual  Percent Denial Tract Residual  Percent Denial  Tract Residual 
Black  Rate Effect Effect  Black  Rate Effect Effect  Black  Rate Effect  Effect 
All MSAs c 1 Million 



























http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 17:  Neighborhood and Unexplained Denial Rate Residuals. Hispanics. by MSA. 1990 HMDA 
Purchase 
Percent Denial  Tract Residual 
Refinance - 
Percent Denial  Tract Residual  Percent Denial  Tract Residual 
Hispanic Rate  Effect  Effect  Hispanic Rate Effect Effect  Hispanic Rate Effect Lffect 
All MSAs c 1 Million 




















St  Louis 






http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 18:  Neighborhood and Unexplained Denial Rate Residuals, Whites, by MSA, 1990 HMDA 
Home Purchase  Refinance - 
Percent Denial  Tract Residual  Percent Denial  Tract Residual  Percent Denial  Tract Residual 
White  Rate  Effect Effect  White  Rate  Effect Effect  White  Rate  Effect Effect 
All MSAs < 1 Million 



























http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 19:  Black-White Residuals by Denial Probability. 1990 HMDA 
Denial Probability 
Want) -  Refinance  Homelmnrovement 
Cumulative Residual  Tract  Cumulative Residual  Tract  Cumulative Residual  Tmct 
Distribution Difference Difference  Distribution Difference Difference  Distribution Difference Difference 




















































More than 50 




Cumulative  Residual  Tract 





















































More than  50 
Refmance 
Cumulative Residual  Tract 
Dishbution Difference Diference 
7.8%  2.4%  0.0% 
8.6  -0.4  1.3 
10.4  2.0  1.3 
12.4  2.2  1 A 
14.6  3.1  1 A 
16.9  2.4  1.9 
19.4  05  2.5 
22.1  1.5  1.9 
25.0  1.3  2.1 
28.0  2.0  2.5 
31.2  4.1  2.6 
34.5  2.6  1.9 
37.9  4.2  2.5 
41.3  5.4  2.4 
44.7  6.0  2.4 
48.0  5.0  2.4 
51.3  5.9  2.4 
54.3  7.0  2.7 
57.3  6.4  2.1 
60.1  4.8  2.9 
62.7  6.7  2.1 
65.2  6.7  2.7 
67.6  7.0  2.2 
69.9  3.4  2.3 
72.2  6.3  .  2.1 
74.3  6.6  22 
76.3  2.6  2.3 
78.2  4.3  1.7 
80.0  4.4  2.2 
81.6  8.1  2.4 
83.2  7.1  2.2 
84.7  9.1  2.1 
86.1  5.3  2.3 
87.3  8.1  1.8 
88.4  6.3  2.2 
89.5  8.0  2.0 
90.5  8.8  2.4 
91.4  2.7  2.1 
92.2  5.0  2.0 
93.0  4.6  3.3 
93.7  6.4  1.7 
94.3  5.7  12 
94.9  8.3  2.3 
95.4  7.6  15 
95.9  6.8  1.4 
96.3  9.4  2.4 
%.7  9.1  1.1 
97.0  9.5  1.7 
97.3  9.1  1.7 
97.5  14.8  4.6 
97.7  11.9  4.5 
97.9  9.4  1.3 
100.0  4.3  1.6 
Home Imorovement 
Cumulative Residual  Tract 
Dishbution Difference Difference 
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